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ABSTRACT 
In 2007 and 2009, respectively, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, abrogated  Conley 
v. Gibson’s notice pleading standard, and imposed a new plausibility 
pleading standard upon the federal court system. Alaska, along with a 
majority of states however, still retains Conley’s “no set of facts” notice 
pleading standard. This Note asks, in light of the difference between the 
federal and Alaska pleading standards, whether Alaska—or any state—could 
be forced to apply the federal pleading standard when it adjudicates federal 
substantive claims. Prior to Iqbal, a plaintiff in Alaska would have faced the 
same pleading obligations in state and federal court regardless of whether he 
pleaded a state or federal claim. As this Note describes, now, a plaintiff could 
face different pleading standards depending on not only where he brings his 
claim, but also, if he’s in state court, whether he brings a state or federal 
claim. The reason for this is the Reverse-Erie doctrine: an little-developed 
judicial choice of law theory that broadly asks which procedure, federal or 
state, applies in a state court proceeding. Using the differences between 
federal and state pleading standards as an opportunity to flesh out Reverse-
Erie, this Note concludes that while it is unlikely that the Supreme Court 
would force a state to adopt the federal pleading standard, the jurisprudential 
framework for such a move exists. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On November 18, 1957, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down Conley v. Gibson1 and ushered in an era of notice pleading. Though 
initially only federal in application, Conley’s interpretation of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) soon swept across the nation. 
Throughout the next half-century, state after state adopted Conley’s 
liberalized notice pleading standard. In 1940, Arizona’s Supreme Court 
adopted the Federal Rules verbatim, making Arizona the first federal 
replica state—”that is, a state with a procedural system modeled after 
the Federal Rules.”2 In 1959, the Alaska Supreme Court adopted its own 
set of procedural rules modeled after the Federal Rules.3 In 1967, that 
court adopted Conley’s interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) and incorporated 
the federal notice pleading standard.4 By 1975, twenty-one other states 
had followed Arizona’s and Alaska’s examples and become federal 
replica states.5 By 2007, fifty years after Conley was decided, twenty-six 
states and the District of Columbia had altered their procedural rules to 
resemble the Federal Rules.6 
On May 21, 2007 and May 18, 2009, respectively, the United States 
Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly7 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal,8 abrogating Conley’s notice pleading standard and imposing a new 
plausibility pleading standard upon the federal courts.9 These decisions 
shook the foundation for those states, like Alaska, that had adopted the 
federal pleading rule using the Conley standard. After Twombly and Iqbal, 
state courts had to decide whether to follow the Supreme Court and 
change from notice to plausibility pleading or stick to the Conley “no set 
 
 1.  355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
 2.  Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading 
Standards, and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1437 (2008). 
 3.  See 2014-15 Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure, ALASKA COURT SYS., 
http://www.courts.alaska.gov/rules/civ2.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) 
(showing that most of the rules were “adopted by [Supreme Court Order] 5 
October 9, 1959”). 
 4.  Shannon v. Anchorage, 429 P.2d 17, 19 (Alaska 1967). See id. at 21 
(Rabinowitz, J., concurring) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46) (“Adopting this last 
mentioned line of authorities, and treating the matter as a motion for summary 
judgment, I am of the opinion that it does not appear ‘beyond doubt’ that 
appellant could prove ‘no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle 
him to relief.”). 
 5.  John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Court, 3 NEV. L.J. 
354, 356–58 (2003). 
 6.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 7.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 8.  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 9.  Id. at 678. 
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of facts” standard. This question was especially daunting for states, like 
Alaska, that had functioned under Conley’s pleading standard for 
decades. 
Two recent state supreme court decisions have thrown this 
question into the forefront of civil procedure discussions. In 2010, the 
Washington Supreme Court handed down McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, 
FSB10 and became the first state supreme court to reject the new 
plausibility pleading standard.11 One year later, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court joined Washington when it decided Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat 
for Humanity, Inc.12 As time draws on, more states will be forced to 
answer this question for themselves. Alaska will certainly be faced with 
this decision. Though a replica state, the Alaska court system has yet to 
address Twombly and Iqbal. As it stands today, Alaska courts still apply 
Conley’s notice pleading requirement to the federal and state claims that 
pass in front of them.13 
This issue has substantial implications for all stages of litigation. 
“Pleading comes early in the life cycle of a case, shapes litigation 
strategy, reveals valuable information to the opposing party (that can be 
used to encourage settlements), and is the gateway to all subsequent 
procedural devices.”14 For pro se litigants in particular, pleading is their 
first exposure to the court system. The accessibility of the court system 
can dramatically affect both the outcome of the litigant’s case and their 
willingness to file a claim. And, unlike certain procedures that only 
affect particular cases, pleading standards affect every case brought in 
court. In Alaska, that means over 150,000 cases annually.15 
In light of Twombly and Iqbal, this Note intends to answer the 
question of which procedure—federal or state—must apply in an Alaska 
state court adjudication of a federal substantive claim when Congress, 
the Constitution, and the Courts have remained silent on this issue. The 
consequences of this question’s answer are crucial to discussions of the 
federal/state balance of power. The jurisprudential doctrine at work, 
Reverse-Erie,16 is little known, rarely documented, and relatively 
 
 10.  233 P.3d 861 (Wash. 2010). 
 11.  Id. at 863. 
 12.  346 S.W.3d 422 (Tenn. 2011). 
 13.  See, e.g., Ex rel. Mickelsen v. North-Wend Foods, Inc., 274 P.3d 1193, 1197 
(Alaska 2012) (applying the Conley standard). 
 14.  Roger Michael Michalski, Tremors of Things to Come: The Great Split 
Between Federal and State Pleading Standards, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 111 (2010). 
 15.  Alaska Court System Annual Report FY 2013, ALASKA COURT SYS. 71 (2014), 
http://www.courts.alaska.gov/reports/annualrep-fy13.pdf. 
 16.  This doctrine is also known as “Converse-Erie” or “Inverse-Erie.” Joseph 
R. Oliveri, Converse-Erie, The Key to Federalism in an Increasingly Administrative 
State, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1372, 1373 (2008); Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. 
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obscure. As Justice O’Connor commented in 1988, “the implications of 
this ‘reverse-Erie’ theory [are not] quite clear.”17 Her comment is an 
understatement. Most of the legal scholarship to touch upon the subject 
has done so only briefly and in minor detail.18 This Note attempts to 
change that. Here, each of the notable Reverse-Erie cases and the 
theories they demonstrate will be put on full display. 
Ultimately, the answer to the question of which procedural law—
federal or state—must apply in state court is unclear. Though it is 
unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever force the heightened 
plausibility pleading standard onto the states that have not adopted it, 
the jurisprudential framework exists for such a move to be made. 
Consequently, the Alaska Supreme Court, and all of the courts in states 
that still apply Conley, should keep their ears to the ground on this 
matter. 
The advent of plausibility pleading and the question it poses to 
state courts, however, presents an opportunity for constitutional law 
scholars to more clearly understand Reverse-Erie. For the last century, 
the Reverse-Erie doctrine has hidden in the shadows of Erie itself, as well 
as federalism, pre-emption, and other monolithic constitutional 
doctrines. Now, as states start to assert their own local procedural 
dominance, Reverse-Erie has a chance to stand in the light of day. Most 
importantly, this situation may eventually provide the Supreme Court 
with an opportunity to apply Reverse-Erie to an essential aspect of civil 
procedure that touches every case across the nation: pleading standards. 
Part I of this Note introduces and explains the current pleading 
situation. Part II explains the fundamental question of the Note. Part III 
delves into the Reverse-Erie doctrine, explaining the theories it 
represents, the cases that develop those theories, and the current state of 
Reverse-Erie jurisprudence. Part IV builds off of the information in Parts 
I–III to answer the question of which procedure—federal or state—must 
apply in an Alaska state court adjudication of a federal substantive 
claim. 
I. THE CURRENT PLEADING SITUATION 
A. The Federal Pleading Standard—Conley, Twombly, and Iqbal 
In 1934, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act (REA)19 and 
 
Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937, 941 n.76 (1988). 
 17.  Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 161 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 18.  See infra notes 69–80. 
 19.  Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 
ARTICLE 6 -  TARPLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2015  2:10 PM 
2015 THE DOCTRINE IN THE SHADOWS 217 
opened the door to a new era of civil procedure in the United States. 
Four years later, under the authority granted to it in the REA, the 
Supreme Court adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), a 
set of procedural rules that govern federal courts across the nation.20 The 
FRCP fundamentally “reshaped civil procedure.”21 Today, the passage 
of the FRCP is largely understood as “the single most substantial 
procedural reform in U.S. history.”22 
Among its many significant changes, the FRCP included a pleading 
requirement in Rule 8. Under Rule 8(a)(2), all that is needed to 
sufficiently construct a federal claim is “a short and plain statement of 
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”23 Rule 8 becomes 
important when the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings is called into 
question. If a defendant files a motion to dismiss “for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted”24 under Rule 12(b)(6), for 
example, the court must determine the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s 
pleadings. 
The Court has interpreted and explained Rule 8(a)(2) in response to 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. In Conley v. Gibson,25 the Court adopted a 
notice pleading standard. “[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his 
claim.”26 Rather, a complaint simply must contain enough information 
to provide notice of the crux of the claim. Under Conley, “a complaint 
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief.”27 For the rest of the twentieth 
century, Conley’s “no set of facts” language “became a cornerstone of 
federal civil procedure.”28 But this era of notice pleading—an era the 
Court had rigorously protected29—did not last.  
 
U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). 
 20.  Stephen C. Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 229, 232–33 (1998). 
 21.  Id. at 233. 
 22.  Id. at 248. 
 23.  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
 24.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). 
 25.  355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 
(2007). 
 26.  Id. at 47. 
 27.  Id. at 45–46 (emphasis added). 
 28.  Michalski, supra note 14, at 115. 
 29.  See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002) 
(defending and enforcing the notice pleading standard against lower courts’ 
more strict interpretations of Rule 8); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (stating that different 
pleading standards “must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal 
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With Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 in 2007 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal31 in 
2009, the Supreme Court abrogated Conley’s notice pleading—sending 
shockwaves throughout the legal community in the process.32 In 
Twombly, a Sherman Antitrust Act33 case, the Court changed pleadings 
from merely requiring notice to requiring “plausibility.”34 Two years 
later, the Court returned to the plausibility pleading standard in Iqbal. 
There, the Court applied the new plausibility pleading standard to all 
federal claims, as opposed to just antitrust suits, and overruled Conley in 
the process.35 
In federal court, merely providing notice is no longer sufficient to 
survive dismissal. Plaintiffs must now allege “enough facts to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”36 More specifically, to avoid 
dismissal under 12(b)(6), plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to 
“nudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”37 
Commentators have closely scrutinized the impact of the 
plausibility pleading standard. Many fear that, contrary to the words of 
the Court,38 the pleading standard had in fact been heightened and had 
become less plaintiff-friendly. In the words of one commentator, federal 
pleading had become “a significant veto-gate through which all claims 
must pass.”39 
B. The Federal and State Responses to the Federal Rules and 
Plausibility Pleading 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the FRCP, state and 
federal courts employed a hodgepodge of pleading standards.40 Part of 
the impetus for the FRCP was to fix this problem. Indeed, the desire for 
procedural uniformity within federal courts played a central role in the 
 
Rules, and not by judicial interpretation”). 
 30.  550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 31.  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 32.  A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, PLEADING IN STATE COURTS AFTER TWOMBLY AND 
IQBAL 2 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2038349. 
 33.  Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2012)). 
 34.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. 
 35.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684. 
 36.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See id. (“[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics . . . .”). 
 39.  Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights 
Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 161 (2010). 
 40.  Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice: Developing 
a Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making Process, 
58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (2005). 
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movement to adopt the FRCP.41 After their passage, the FRCP were 
hailed as “a triumph of uniformity over localism.”42 Though adopted 
with broad appeal, the FRCP could only, by definition, apply to the 
federal courts. The states, however, did not ignore the change. In 1940, 
Arizona’s Supreme Court adopted the FRCP verbatim, making Arizona 
the first federal replica state—”that is, a state with a procedural system 
modeled after the Federal Rules.”43 By 1975, twenty-three states had 
become federal replica states.44 By 2007, when Twombly was decided, 
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia had altered their 
procedural rules to resemble the FRCP.45 And many states that did not 
model their rules exactly after the Federal Rules still looked to the FRCP 
for guidance.46  
Unfortunately, the push towards national procedural uniformity 
has since slowed, if not reversed.47 Many reasons have been cited, but 
perhaps the most compelling is that unique local concerns have weighed 
heavily on the minds of state judges.48 State judges have increasingly 
asserted these local concerns, including “discovery abuse, expense and 
delay, excessive judicial power and discretion, excessive court 
rulemaking, unpredictability, litigiousness, an overly adversarial 
atmosphere, unequal resources of parties, lack of focus, and formal 
adjudication itself.”49 Citing these concerns and others, certain state 
courts have become less willing to follow the federal courts’ example.50 
Recall that the replica states, following the Supreme Court’s lead, 
 
 41.  Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: 
A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States That Have Not Adopted the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 312 (2001). 
 42.  Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Freidman, The Fragmentation of Federal 
Rules, 46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 757 (1995). 
 43.  Chen, supra note 2, at 1437. 
 44.  Oakley, supra note 5, at 356–58. 
 45.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 46.  See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Comment on the Federalism of the Federal Rules, 
28 DUKE L.J. 843, 843 (1979). (“Well over half the states now have civil rules 
closely patterned after the [FRCP], and movement toward adoption of federal-
model rules continues in at least some way in the other states.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 47.  Oakley, supra note 5, at 355. 
 48.  Michalski, supra note 14, at 113. 
 49.  Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 911–12 (1987) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 50.  See, e.g., Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 
422, 430 (Tenn. 2011) (declining to adopt the new plausibility standard in state 
court); McCurry v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 233 P.3d 861, 864 (Wash. 2010) 
(same). 
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had adopted the Conley “no set of facts” liberal notice pleading standard. 
After the Court’s adoption of plausibility pleading in Twombly and Iqbal, 
these courts, in addition to those in non-replica states, have the 
opportunity to reevaluate their own procedural systems. “Iqbal thus 
creates a tension between the desire of some states to achieve uniformity 
with federal courts and the desire to follow the same standard as other 
states.”51 
II. THE QUESTION 
Federal and state courts face different procedural obligations. In 
federal court, federal procedure takes precedence—it applies, in large 
part, in both subject matter and diversity jurisdiction cases; when a 
Federal Rule governs the matter, the Federal Rule applies.52 Therefore, 
regardless of whether the court adjudicates a federal or state substantive 
claim, there is no procedural uniformity concern. State courts, in 
contrast, are faced with a slightly different situation. In state court, state 
procedures always apply to state substantive claims.53 When the state 
court adjudicates federal substantive claims, however, the Supremacy 
Clause comes into play.54 Consequently, the situation is not nearly so 
clear. As discussed in Part III, sometimes state procedure applies and 
other times federal procedure applies. 
This presents an intriguing set of scenarios. If a state had replicated 
the Federal Rules in all cases and incorporated plausibility pleading 
across the board, theoretically there would be pure procedural 
uniformity for both state and federal courts applying both state and 
federal substantive law. But if a state retains its own set of civil 
procedures, the procedure applied in state and federal adjudications, as 
well as between federal adjudications of state and federal substantive 
law, will differ. For advocates of uniformity, this second scenario is 
clearly less desirable. 
The above scenarios are premised upon a state’s ability to choose 
its own procedure. But, as is discussed below, that premise is not 
 
 51.  Michalski, supra note 14, at 114. 
 52.  Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 398 (2010). 
 53.  See, e.g., Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 430 (“Although federal judicial decisions 
‘interpreting rules similar to our own are persuasive authority for purposes of 
construing the Tennessee rule,’ they ‘are non-binding even when the state and 
federal rules are identical.’” (quoting Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 745 n.2 
(Tenn. 2000))). 
 54.  Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20 (2006). 
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certain.55 And, were a state forced to implement federal procedure in 
certain cases, a much more complex scenario would arise: two systems 
of procedure would exist in both state and federal court adjudications—
one for state law substantive claims, another for federal substantive law 
claims. For those preaching uniformity, this would be a disaster.56 
Unfortunately for uniformity-advocates, this latter scenario is 
gaining traction. Through a variety of cases, the Supreme Court has 
imposed federal procedure upon certain state court adjudications of 
federal substantive law.57 The theory at the foundation of this 
development, Reverse-Erie, has been largely unexplored.  
The general formulation of the question this Note seeks to 
answer—the heart of Reverse-Erie—is therefore, “which procedure—
federal or state—must apply in an Alaska state court adjudication of a 
federal substantive claim when Congress, the Constitution, and the 
Courts have remained silent on this issue?” The more specific form asks 
this same question but with regards to pleading standards in particular. 
As states, including Alaska, now evaluate whether to change their 
pleading standards,58 Reverse-Erie, while obscure, may, if the answer to 
the question asked is that federal procedures must apply, have serious 
consequences. In certain cases, Alaska state courts may be obligated to 
use the plausibility standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal59 rather than the “no set 
of facts” standard currently in effect. 
As “[p]leading comes early in the life cycle of a case, shapes 
litigation strategy, reveals valuable information to the opposing party 
(that can be used to encourage settlements), and is the gateway to all 
subsequent procedural devices,”60 its significance cannot be 
underestimated. The logistics of procedural rule changes aside, the 
imposition of federal procedure in state court adjudication carries with it 
concerns of federalism and the balance of power between the state and 
federal court systems. 
 
 55.  See infra Part IV. 
 56. Of course, for advocates of broad federalism, the same situation could be 
utopic. 
 57.  See infra Part III. 
 58.  See Michalski, supra note 14, at 109 (“In the months and years to come, 
other states will face the dilemma [of whether to change their rules or not].”). 
 59.  556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 60.  Michalski, supra note 14, at 111. 
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III. REVERSE-ERIE 
A. The Doctrine 
In 1938, the Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.61 
This was seemingly a narrow decision—answering only a single 
question of which substantive law, federal or state, applied in certain 
federal court proceedings.62 However, Erie went on to spawn decades of 
litigation, the cumulative result of which has come to be known as the 
Erie Doctrine. The Erie Doctrine encompasses, on its face, a judicial 
choice-of-law methodology, “commonly understood to embrace all 
situations in which [a federal] court must choose between federal or 
state law.”63 Sprawling across thousands of cumulative pages in 
casebooks and law student outlines, and across hundreds of court 
opinions and law review articles, the Erie Doctrine stands, in the words 
of Justice Harlan, as “one of the modern cornerstones of our 
federalism”64—a way for the judiciary to balance the scales of power 
between state and federal governments. For the purposes of this Note, 
however, it suffices to describe the doctrine as the narrow answer Erie 
itself addressed: which law, federal or state, applies in a federal court 
proceeding. 
Given the Erie Doctrine’s prominence, it may seem odd that it has 
been described as merely “a false front on a movie set,”65 and only “the 
opposite side of the federalism coin.”66 Behind the traditional Erie 
Doctrine’s fake front (or on its other side, depending on your metaphor 
of choice) looms a similar, yet distinct, question. This question broadly 
asks which law, federal or state, applies in a state court proceeding.67 
Theoretically, the answer to this question (“Reverse-Erie”) has the 
potential to have as much of an impact, if not greater, on the judicial 
system than its traditional cousin. While the Erie Doctrine applies only 
in federal court—a judicial system of limited jurisdiction—Reverse-Erie 
applies in state courts—judicial systems of extremely broad jurisdiction. 
As one scholar has commented, Reverse-Erie “seems to pose a question 
at least as important as Erie—and in fact numerically far more significant 
 
 61.  304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 62.  Id. at 69. 
 63.  Donald L. Doernberg, The Unseen Track of Erie Railroad: Why History and 
Jurisprudence Suggest a More Straightforward Form of Erie Analysis, 109 W. VA. L. 
REV. 611, 612 n.2 (2007). 
 64.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 65.  Clermont, supra note 54, at 2. 
 66.  Id. at 4. 
 67.  Id. at 2. 
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because, as everybody knows, the volume of business in state courts 
dwarfs that in federal courts.”68 
Unfortunately, unlike the Erie Doctrine, this Reverse-Erie Doctrine 
is not nearly as ubiquitous as its traditional counterpart. In fact, in a 2006 
survey of law school casebooks, Cornell Law Professor Kevin M. 
Clermont noted that, while all eighteen mainstream civil procedure 
casebooks cover the Erie Doctrine,69 (devoting an average of sixty-three 
pages to it),70 seven casebooks avoid the Reverse-Erie Doctrine entirely,71 
three mention it only in passing,72 three mention its bare bones73 and 
only five afford any sort of serious attention to it,74 all devoting fewer 
than ten pages to the doctrine.75 Even more remarkably, out of the eight 
current mainstream federal courts casebooks examined by Professor 
Clermont, three do not address the topic at all,76 four mention it with a 
glancing, secondary focus77 and only one devotes serious attention to 
it.78 “While everyone has an Erie theory and stands ready to debate it,” 
Professor Clermont lamented, “almost no one has a theory of [R]everse-
Erie, and no one at all has developed a clear choice-of-law methodology 
for it.”79 For something that is “often misunderstood, mischaracterized, 
and misapplied by judges and commentators,” it is strange that most 
scholars ignore it completely.80 
There is, however, ample reason for both this lack of attention and 
the confusion surrounding the doctrine. First, although it may be 
tantalizing to call Reverse-Erie the mirror image of Erie,81 Reverse-Erie 
actually poses a distinct question:82 to what extent do state courts, when 
 
 68.  Id. at 4. 
 69.  Id. at 50 n.198. 
 70.  Id. at 50. 
 71.  Id. at 51. 
 72.  Id. at 51 n.199. 
 73.  Id. at 51 n.200. 
 74.  Id. at 51 n.201. 
 75.  Id. at 51. 
 76.  Id. at 53 n.209. 
 77.  Id. at 53 n.210. 
 78.  Id. at 54 n.211. 
 79.  Id. at 2. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to 
Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. 
REV. 71, 100 (1998) (referring to Reverse-Erie cases as “the mirror-image of the 
situation involved in the Court’s famed decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins”). 
 82.  See Clermont, supra note 54, at 4 (“Reverse-Erie [asks] . . . [i]n state court, 
when does state law apply and when does federal law apply? By this 
formulation, reverse-Erie poses a question very similar to the Erie question—
although tantalizingly, it does not have an identical answer.”). 
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adjudicating substantive federal rights, have to use federal procedures 
in lieu of state procedures?83 Second, this specific question is rarely 
addressed. There are very few cases that touch upon Reverse-Erie in any 
meaningful way. The cases that do exist are, unfortunately, spread 
widely throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, each case follows a 
different approach on how to resolve the Reverse-Erie question.84 
Additionally, remarkably few law review articles have addressed 
Reverse-Erie.85 Those that have addressed the doctrine have not agreed 
on how to interpret the case law.86 Third, Reverse-Erie touches upon 
several different and substantial legal doctrines, many of which are well-
known and within which it is easy to get lost in the concepts discussed 
and language used: conflict-of-law,87 commandeering,88 pre-emption,89 
the Supremacy Clause,90 and the related doctrine of Testa v. Katt,91 to 
name a few. The use of such concepts and language in Reverse-Erie 
scholarship usually results in a mixed terminology, increased confusion, 
and decreased clarity. 
Our knowledge of the Reverse-Erie problem stems from the few 
Supreme Court cases to touch upon the doctrine. Unfortunately, while 
state courts routinely handle Reverse-Erie cases, their decisions do not 
shed particularly helpful light on the subject.92 And in cases where state 
courts have either recognized or discussed the issue, they have tended to 
 
 83.  Oliveri, supra note 16, at 1378. 
 84.  See infra; See also Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 101 (“At various 
times, the Supreme Court appears to have chosen among . . .  different models in 
order to resolve the converse-Erie question, albeit without expressly recognizing 
those differences.”). 
 85.  See Clermont, supra note 54, at 2 n.5 (summarizing the literature as of 
2006). 
 86.  Compare, e.g., id. at 23–27 (describing a split between two interest 
balancing theories: pre-emption and judicial choice-of-law), with Oliveri, supra 
note 16, at 1378–83 (describing a split between two choice of law presumptions: 
pro-federal and pro-forum). 
 87.  See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 
110 YALE L.J. 947, 976–83 (2001). And, within discussions of conflict-of-law, both 
“interest analysis” and “sovereignty” principle language are common. See, e.g., 
id. at 979, 984. 
 88.  See, e.g., id. at 958–63. 
 89.  See Clermont, supra note 54, at 5 (noting that many scholars often start 
their discussions of Reverse-Erie with a pre-emption analysis). 
 90.  U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2; see, e.g., Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State 
Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1743, 1784 (1992). 
 91.  330 U.S. 386 (1947); see, e.g., Reza Dibadj, From Incongruity to Cooperative 
Federalism, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 845, 874 (2006). 
 92.  See Clermont, supra note 54, at 29 n.134 (“There are literally millions of 
state cases applying reverse-Erie, because the choice-of-law issue is ubiquitous. 
But most such applications are intuitive. Few cases shed light on the appropriate 
methodology.” (citations omitted)). 
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defer to Supreme Court precedent.93 Therefore, the best indicator of the 
state of Reverse-Erie at the moment stems from the scant occasions on 
which the Supreme Court has addressed the doctrine. 
So what do we know about Reverse-Erie? As a preliminary matter, 
the Reverse-Erie question is premised upon the pre-existence of relevant 
federal procedural law.94 Based upon this foundation, scholars have 
divided Reverse-Erie into two broad categories.95 The first category is 
simple. Whenever the Constitution, Congress (either explicitly or 
implicitly), or a federal court mandates that a certain federal procedure 
must be used when adjudicating a federal substantive claim, a state 
court is bound to apply that particular procedure.96 The second Reverse-
Erie category, on the other hand, is much more complicated. When the 
Constitution, Congress, and the federal courts are silent on which 
federal procedure accompanies a federal right, which procedure—
federal or state—must a state court use when it adjudicates the federal 
right? It is the answer to this second question with which this Note is 
concerned and towards which the Alaska court system and all state 
court systems similarly situated should turn a watchful eye. 
B. The Theories 
The relevant Supreme Court cases, unfortunately, do not provide a 
clear answer to this second question. In fact, at times the theories they 
posit contradict. But by applying a source test—asking whether the 
procedure originated internally or externally to the substantive federal 
claim—the case law can be sorted into two relatively clear categories, 
each espousing a different Reverse-Erie theory. From these theories it is 
possible to give predictive value to the Reverse-Erie doctrine.97 It is 
 
 93.  Id. at 28–29; see, e.g., Bowman v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 142 N.E.2d 104, 114 (Ill. 
1957). 
 94.  Clermont, supra note 54, at 11. 
 95.  See, e.g., id. (dividing the analysis into two “questions”); Oliveri, supra 
note 16 (dividing the analysis into two “situations”); Redish & Sklaver, supra 
note 81, at 100–01 (dividing the analysis into two “questions”). 
 96.  Clermont, supra note 54, at 20. Of course, this is true only if the federal 
procedure is constitutionally valid. Id. Intriguingly, an argument could be made 
that Twombly is just this sort of federal court mandate with regard to antitrust 
claims, and therefore that state courts must apply the heightened pleading 
standard in those cases regardless of state procedural law. But this Note will not 
address this possibility, instead focusing on only the broader question of 
whether Alaska’s pleading standard would have to yield to the new federal 
standard generally, rather than in some specific subset of cases. 
 97.  The Reverse-Erie literature has been, in large part, a search for 
predictability. Scholars have lamented the inherent unpredictability of balancing 
tests with unknown methodology. E.g., Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 104. 
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unclear, however, which theory predominates. 
The first category of Reverse-Erie cases presents what this Note 
terms the “internal-source theory.” In this category, a strong 
presumption exists in favor of the application of federal procedure in a 
state court adjudication of a federal substantive claim only when the 
procedure  exists within the federal substantive claim’s text, purpose, or 
legislative history. If the federal procedure does not originate from 
within the substantive claim, then the lex fori, the law of the jurisdiction 
adjudicating the claim, applies. It is within this group that the “general 
[conflict-of-law] rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of 
state control of state judicial procedure, . . . that federal law takes the 
state courts as it finds them”98 finds purchase. 
Practically, this is accomplished through a narrow conflict pre-
emption analysis, utilized to pre-empt state rules only when explicit 
indications of congressional intent are present. Justice O’Connor is a 
strong advocate of this view. In her dissent in Felder v. Casey,99 she 
exclaimed, “without some compellingly clear indication that Congress had 
forbidden the States to apply such statutes in their courts, there is no 
reason to conclude that they are ‘pre-empted’ by federal law.”100 
Interestingly, the Court engages in this conflict-of-laws 
substance/procedure dichotomy only to describe the situations where 
pre-emption is not applicable.101 There is also a safety valve. The cases 
hint, albeit cryptically, that the requirement to apply federal procedure, 
when it exists, may yield when the imposition of the federal procedure 
would force a state’s judicial system to undergo unduly burdensome 
changes.102 Cases in this category include Central Vermont Railway Co. v. 
White,103 Felder, Howlett v. Rose,104 and Johnson v. Fankell.105 
The second category of Reverse-Erie cases presents what this Note 
terms the “external-source theory.” Here, the Court applies a balancing 
test to determine the application of federal procedure when a state court 
 
 98. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. 
L. REV. 489, 508 (1954). 
 99. 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 100. Id. at 157 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 101. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 373 (1990) (using this language to 
refer to the other state procedural rules that the Court did not pre-empt). 
 102.  See Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363–64 
(1952) (noting that, had Ohio abolished trial by jury in all negligence cases, then 
perhaps the Court would not have forced the state to hold a jury trial in the 
negligence case before it); see also Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 103–04 
(analyzing Dice). 
 103.  238 U.S. 507 (1915). 
 104.  496 U.S. 356 (1990). 
 105.  520 U.S. 911 (1997). 
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adjudicates a federal substantive claim, even when the procedure 
originates outside of the text, purpose, or legislative history of the 
substantive claim.106 This balancing test is weighted in favor of keeping 
federal substantive claims and federal procedures together. It is unclear, 
however, how rebuttable or strong this presumption is as the reasoning 
behind the imposition of federal procedure has varied from case to 
case.107 
Unlike the internal-source theory, the external-source theory is 
marked by its minimal reliance on pre-emption and heavy use of 
alternative theories to justify the application of federal procedure in 
state court.108 For example, it is not uncommon to see the Court frame 
the problem entirely in conflict-of-law terms, tracking the general 
conflict-of-law principle that “a forum state may apply its own 
procedural law to all rights of action that it enforces.”109 Whereas the 
Court will mirror this language when it follows the internal-source 
theory, it uses it in an opposite way. Under the internal-source theory, 
this language is invoked to describe the situation when the state 
procedural rule at issue is not pre-empted. Conversely, the Court under 
the external-source theory will usually reclassify the state procedural 
rule at issue as substantive and then use the conflict language to pre-
empt it. Here, the Court will refer to the state procedure as “too 
substantial a part of the rights . . . to permit it to be classified as a mere 
‘local rule of procedure’,”110 or reclassify the rule as “part of the very 
substance of his claim [that] cannot be considered a mere incident to a 
form of procedure.”111 This reclassification language, commonly found 
in conflict-of-law cases, tracks the external-source theory regardless of 
whether the rule is mentioned in the text, purpose, or legislative history 
of the claim in question. Cases in this category include Central Vermont, 
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,112 Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,113 
Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railraod Co.,114 Felder, and Johnson.  
 
 106.  See generally, e.g., Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (applying a 
federal procedure that originated outside of the substantive federal claim). 
 107.  Compare Johnson, 520 U.S. 911 (avoiding imposing federal procedure in 
the face of a weak federal interest and strong state interests), with Brown, 338 U.S. 
294 (imposing a federal procedure because the state procedure would “burden 
federal rights”). 
 108.  See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361–62 
(1952) (relying heavily on conflict-of-law reasoning). 
 109.  Bellia, supra note 87, at 978. 
 110.  Dice, 342 U.S at 363. 
 111.  Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 249 (1942). 
 112.  317 U.S. 239 (1942). 
 113.  338 U.S. 294 (1949). 
 114.  342 U.S. 359 (1952). 
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Note that Central Vermont, Felder, and Johnson are included in both 
the internal- and external-source-theory-case lists. That is because these 
three cases contain strands of both internal- and external-source 
theories. The Supreme Court, in these cases, gave multiple reasons for 
its decisions without selecting a predominant theory—a fact that 
exacerbates the confusion associated with Reverse-Erie. Because of this, 
the portion of the opinions positing the internal-source theory will be 
discussed along with the other internal-source-theory cases, and the 
external-source-theory portions will be discussed with the other 
external-source-theory cases. 
It may be tempting to see the internal-source theory merely as 
dealing with pre-emption and the external-source theory merely as a 
manifestation of conflict-of-law principles. Indeed, if that were true, 
there would be no need to reclassify these theories into these newly 
termed categories. But the reality is not that simple. Both theories 
incorporate bits of the other—the internal sometimes using a balancing 
approach and the external occasionally venturing into pre-emption 
territory. In both internal- and external-source-theory cases, the various 
underlying principles at work combine to form a single Reverse-Erie 
understanding. Describing both internal- and external-source theories as 
merely the individual parts that form them would therefore be 
confusing and ultimately unhelpful. Instead, the reclassification of the 
Court’s grouping of underlying principles under new headings in the 
hopes of providing clarity and predictability in the Reverse-Erie debate. 
1. Internal-Source-Theory Cases 
a. Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White—1915 
 
In 1915, the Court decided one of the earliest Reverse-Erie cases, 
Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White.115 Central Vermont provides a 
cutaway glimpse into the inner-workings of a nascent Reverse-Erie 
theory. Indeed, this case contains early strands of both internal- and 
external-source theories. As such, it is a helpful starting point on which 
to base this analysis. 
On January 12, 1912, Enoch White, a brakeman for the Central 
Vermont Railway Company, was killed when a faster moving train on 
the same track hit his train from behind.116 Moments before the accident, 
the faster moving train was given a clearance card by the railway 
company “indicating that the track ahead was clear and that it might 
 
 115.  238 U.S. 507 (1915). 
 116.  Id. at 509–10. 
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proceed.”117 White’s widow, the administratrix of his estate, sued the 
railway company in Vermont, under the Federal Employers Liability Act 
(FELA),118 for negligence.119 The case centered on the question of which 
party should bear the burden of proof for contributory negligence.120 
Under Vermont state law, the plaintiff bore the burden of proof.121 
Federal law, in contrast, placed the burden of proof upon the 
defendant.122 The text of FELA was silent as to burden of proof.123 
Oral argument in the Supreme Court was devoted to the question 
of which law applied.124 The railway argued that because the law at 
issue was procedural, the lex fori (law of the forum) must apply.125 
White’s estate argued that because the suit arose under FELA, a federal 
law, federal procedural law must apply.126 Resolving the issue, the 
Supreme Court applied the federal procedural law.127 The Court’s 
explanation, however, was opaque. The Court declined to select 
between the two separate lines of reasoning it supplied. The argument 
discussed here tracks the internal-source theory. The Court’s external-
source-theory argument is discussed in the next Section. 
In relevant part, the Court attacked the case from a conflict pre-
emption point of view.128 When state procedural rules either bar the 
remedy or destroy the liability created by the federal substantive law, 
the Court commented, then “the law of the jurisdiction, creating the 
cause of action . . . would control.”129 The Court’s contention tracks 
traditional principles of conflict pre-emption, namely, that state laws are 
pre-empted by federal law whenever “under the circumstances of [a] 
particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”130 Here, the Court held that “Congress, in passing [FELA], 
evidently intended that the Federal statute be construed in the light of 
[federal court decisions which] . . . have uniformly held that, as a matter 
 
 117.  Id. at 509. 
 118.  45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012). 
 119.  Cent. Vt., 238 U.S. at 508. 
 120.  Id. at 510–11. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 512. 
 123.  Id. at 511. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 512. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 511. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) 
(alterations in original) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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of general law, the burden of proving contributory negligence is on the 
defendant.”131 Under this conflict pre-emption language, then, federal 
law must apply because not applying the rule would frustrate 
congressional intent. 
This argument reflects the internal-source theory. The Court 
applied a narrow conflict pre-emption analysis, limiting its pre-emption 
doctrine to only those cases where congressional intent was clear. Note 
that the pre-emption analysis is fairly straightforward. Throughout the 
twentieth century, however, as both internal- and external-source 
theories developed, the Court’s reasoning became more complex, 
incorporating more theories into its analysis. 
b. Felder v. Casey—1988 
 
Seventy-three years later, the Court revisited the internal-source 
theory. In Felder v. Casey,132 the Supreme Court rejected the view that 
state courts take all federal substantive law free of accompanying federal 
procedure and may apply their own state procedures.133 On July 4, 1981, 
Milwaukee native Bobby Felder was stopped by police officers for 
questioning in the midst of a search for an armed suspect.134 During the 
questioning, the interrogation turned violent and Felder was beaten and 
arrested.135 Nine months later, Felder filed a Section 1983136 claim against 
the city of Milwaukee and certain police officers, claiming that his 
beating and arrest were both “unprovoked and racially motivated.”137 
The police officers quickly moved to dismiss Felder’s case, arguing that 
his suit failed to comply with Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute, a local 
state procedure.138 That statute required that every action against any 
state entity include a written notice of the claim within 120 days of the 
alleged injury.139 The federal statute, Section 1983, contained no such 
notice-of-claim requirement.140 The state trial court dismissed the case, 
 
 131.  Cent. Vt., 238 U.S. at 511–12. 
 132.  487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 133.  Id. at 137. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had adhered to the strict 
procedure/substance dichotomy. See id. (describing the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court as reasoning that “while Congress may establish the procedural 
framework under which claims are heard in federal courts, States retain the 
authority under the Constitution to prescribe the rules and procedures that 
govern actions in their own tribunals”). 
 134.  Id. at 134. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 137.  Felder, 487 U.S. at 135. 
 138.  Id. at 136. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  See id. at 140 (“[In the federal system,] the absence of any notice-of-claim 
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applying the state procedural rule to the federal substantive claim.141 On 
appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while 
Congress may establish federal procedure, the states retain the authority 
to prescribe the procedure for all substantive actions, federal or state, 
brought in their courts.142 The United States Supreme Court reversed 
and applied federal procedure.143 
The Court relied on two distinct lines of reasoning to explain its 
decision to apply federal procedure to the federal substantive claim in 
state court. In the first part of its opinion, the Court adopted a conflict 
pre-emption analysis coupled with a limited version of the 
substance/procedure analysis found in conflict-of-law cases. For pre-
emption, the Court held that “the notice-of-claim statute at issue here 
conflicts in both its purpose and effects with the remedial objectives of § 
1983 . . . .”144 Regarding the substance/procedure analysis, the Court 
stated that the “the general and unassailable proposition . . . that states 
may establish the rules of procedure . . . in their own courts,” is limited 
only to those situations where there exists no pre-emption problem.145 In 
the face of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s holding that the only test is 
one of substance or procedure,146 the Court commented that “[h]owever 
equitable this bitter-with-the-sweet argument may appear in the 
abstract, it has no place under our Supremacy Clause analysis.”147 
This line of reasoning tracks the internal-source theory almost 
exactly. The Court carefully protected federal substantive claims while 
deftly leaving room for states to apply their own procedures in certain 
situations. Indeed, “[s]tates may make the litigation of federal rights as 
congenial as they see fit . . . because such congeniality does not stand as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’ goals.”148 This decision 
reflects “a high degree of care and effort” on the part of the Court to 
maintain separate spheres of state and federal authority.149  
While its pre-emption language is strong, the Court did not yet 
appear committed to either theory as the sole source of its Reverse-Erie 
jurisprudence. That is because the Court also put forth the more 
expansive external-source theory in its opinion, which is discussed 
 
provision is not a deficiency requiring the importation of such statutes into the 
federal civil rights scheme.” (emphasis added)). 
 141.  Id. at 137. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. at 138. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 138, 150. 
 146.  Id. at 137. 
 147.  Id. at 150. 
 148.  Id. at 151. 
 149.  Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 107. 
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below in Part III.B.3.e. 
c. Howlett v. Rose—1990 
 
In Howlett v. Rose,150 another Section 1983 case, the Supreme Court 
faced a Florida waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statute that prevented 
certain Section 1983 cases from being brought in state court.151 Mark 
Howlett, a minor and former high school student, sued his school board 
and three school officials in Florida state court, claiming, in relevant 
part,152 that his former assistant principle made an illegal search of his 
car in alleged contravention of Howlett’s Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.153 The defendants asserted their sovereign immunity 
pursuant to Florida state procedure and moved to dismiss the Section 
1983 claim.154 As the Supreme Court later noted, a sovereign immunity 
defense would not have been available had the case been brought in 
federal court.155 
The Supreme Court reversed the Florida courts, holding that the 
Supremacy Clause pre-empted the application of the state procedural 
rule.156 Regardless of whether the rule constituted a substantive or 
procedural rule, the Court found that since federal courts had already 
interpreted the relevant portions of Section 1983, a state statute was 
constitutionally estopped from altering that interpretation: 
Since this Court has construed the word ‘person’ in § 1983 to 
exclude States, neither a federal court nor a state court may 
entertain a § 1983 action against such a defendant. Conversely, 
since the Court has held that municipal corporations and 
similar governmental entities [like the School Board here] are 
‘persons,’ a state court entertaining a § 1983 action must adhere 
to that interpretation.157 
Even more pertinently, the Court found that Congress, by 
including municipalities within the class of persons subject to Section 
1983 liability, had already addressed the issue and therefore that the 
 
 150.  496 U.S. 356 (1990). 
 151.  Id. at 359–60. 
 152.  Howlett’s claim also included several state law causes of action. Id. at 
359. These claims are, however, irrelevant to Reverse-Erie. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See id. (describing how Florida’s waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statute 
did not cover section 1983 claims). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 375. 
 157.  Id. at 376 (citations removed). 
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state was pre-empted from altering the congressional act.158 
The Court’s decision nicely tracked the internal-source theory. 
Indeed, Howlett stands as one of the few pure internal-source-theory 
cases. First, the Court cited “the general rule, ‘bottomed deeply in belief 
in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, . . . that 
federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.’”159 Second, the Court 
cited the pre-emption holding from Felder that “states may apply their 
own neutral procedural rules to federal claims, unless those rules are 
pre-empted by federal law.”160 Third, and most revealing, the Court 
committed itself to an understanding of federalism based on the 
internal-source theory. “These principles,” the Court held, “are 
fundamental to a system of federalism in which state courts share 
responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal law.”161 
Running through these points, the Court committed itself to only 
imposing federal procedure in cases of pre-emption, leaving state 
adjudication of federal claims alone. Seventy-five years after Central 
Vermont, the Court appeared committed to the internal-source theory as 
the sole method of Reverse-Erie analysis. That commitment, however, 
did not last. 
d. Johnson v. Fankell—1997 
 
In Johnson v. Fankell,162 the most recent Reverse-Erie case, a 
unanimous Court presented both internal- and external-source theories 
simultaneously without favoring one over the other. At issue was a 
Section 1983 claim made by a liquor store clerk in Idaho against her 
former employer, in which she claimed a deprivation of her Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process rights.163 The clerk’s employers claimed 
qualified immunity.164 When their motion to dismiss was denied, they 
appealed, treating the denial as an appealable final judgment.165 Had 
they been in federal court, it would have been.166 Under Idaho state 
procedure, however, the denial of a qualified immunity defense is not 
 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 372 (quoting Hart, supra note 98). 
 160.  Id. (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150 (1988)). 
 161.  Id. at 372–73 (emphasis added). 
 162.  520 U.S. 911 (1997). 
 163.  Id. at 913. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. at 913–14. 
 166.  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985) (holding that a 
federal court’s rejection of a qualified immunity defense is an immediately 
appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012)). 
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considered an appealable final decision.167 The Idaho Supreme Court 
therefore dismissed the appeal.168 After granting certiorari, the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the dismissal.169 For the first and only time 
in these cases, the Court put a limit on the intrusion of federal 
procedural rules into state court adjudications and refused to pre-empt 
state procedure.170 
The Supreme Court refused to allow the federal procedure here to 
intrude into state court for two primary reasons. The first is discussed 
here. The second, an external-source-theory-based reason, is discussed 
in the following Section. Here, the Court did not veil its search for the 
source of the procedural obligation: “[i]n evaluating [petitioner’s] 
contention, it is important to focus on the precise source and scope of the 
federal right at issue.”171 The Court noted that the procedure the 
petitioners sought did not exist in Section 1983, under which petitioners 
had been sued.172 Rather, it existed in Section 1291 of Chapter 28 of the 
United States Code.173 “The former right is fully protected by Idaho. The 
latter right, however, is a federal procedural right that simply does not 
apply in a nonfederal forum.”174 Providing context, the Court cited a 
previous holding from Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad 
Co.:175 “[i]n that case, however, we made clear that Congress had 
provided in FELA that the jury trial procedure was to be part of claims 
brought under the Act.”176 
This reasoning tracks the internal-source theory. The Court’s 
language hinted that, had the appeal of the qualified immunity been 
included in the text, purpose, or legislative history of Section 1983, 
federal procedure would have applied in Idaho.177 Instead, as the source 
of the procedure was Section 1291, a different statute, the state was 
under no obligation to enforce it.178 The Court also cited the classic 
internal-source theory language that “federal law takes the state courts 
as it finds them.”179 Finally, the Court relied heavily on Howlett, 
 
 167.  Johnson, 520 U.S. at 914. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. at 923. 
 171.  Id. at 921. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  342 U.S. 359 (1952). 
 176.  Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921 n.12. (citing Dice, 342 U.S. at 363). 
 177.  See id. at 921 (“[I]t is important to focus on the precise scope and source of 
the federal right at issue” (emphasis added)). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. at 919 (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 372 (1990)). 
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described above as one of the few pure internal-source-theory cases, in 
this part of its opinion. 
Notably, the Court inserted a safety valve into the internal-source 
theory. At the very end of the opinion, the Court expressed repulsion at 
the thought of displacing fully established state court procedural 
systems: “[t]he ‘countervailing considerations’ at issue here are even 
stronger . . . . This respect [for principles of federalism] is at its apex 
when we confront a claim that federal law requires a State to undertake 
something as fundamental as restructuring the operation of its 
courts.”180 As this comment came at the end of the opinion, it is unclear 
to which theory it is supposed to adhere. Most likely, this comment 
applies equally to both, reminding scholars that neither theory is black 
and white and, like Professor Clermont carefully noted, while pre-
emption plays a big part in the Reverse-Erie analysis, there is always 
room for judicial choice-of-law.181 
2. Summary of Internal-Source Theory 
 
As of Johnson, the internal-source theory has survived eighty-two 
years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. From this longevity, we can 
glean some predictive value. We know that, under an internal-source 
theory of Reverse-Erie, the Court is likely to apply a narrow conflict pre-
emption theory, only pre-empting when congressional intent is clear. 
Outside of those instances, the Court is reticent to reclassify procedural 
rights as substantive and is eager to let state courts apply their own 
procedural rules to federal causes of action. This theory is not black and 
white, however; a slight balancing test applies. The Court is unlikely to 
pre-empt state procedure when doing so would force the state court 
system to restructure its procedural rules in a significant way. The 
internal-source theory attempts to adhere to strict principles of 
federalism and is concerned with the federal/state balance of powers. 
3. External-Source-Theory Cases 
a. Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White—1915 
 
Recall that in Central Vermont Railway Co. v. White,182 a brakeman 
for the Central Vermont Railway Company was killed when a faster 
moving train hit his train from behind.183 The case centered on the 
 
 180.  Id. at 922. 
 181.  Clermont, supra note 54, at 20. 
 182.  238 U.S. 507 (1915). 
 183.  Id. at 509–10. 
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question of which party bore the burden of proof for contributory 
negligence.184 Under Vermont state law, the plaintiff bore the burden of 
proof.185 Federal law, by contrast, placed the burden of proof on the 
defendant.186 Crucially, the text of FELA was silent as to burden of 
proof.187 
Arguing from an internal-source-theory mindset, the Court initially 
found that “Congress, in passing [FELA], evidently intended that the 
Federal statute be construed in the light of [federal court decisions].”188 
These decisions “uniformly held that, as a matter of general law, the 
burden of proving contributory negligence is on the defendant.”189 
Using this conflict pre-emption language, the Court held that federal 
law must apply because not applying the rule would frustrate 
congressional intent. 
But the Court also supplied a second, distinct reason for its 
holding.190 This second line of reasoning is notable for its minimal 
reliance on pre-emption and heavy reliance of conflict-of-laws 
principles.191 One important conflict-of-law principle is that “a forum 
state may apply its own procedural law to all rights of action that it 
enforces.”192 So, with respect to the relationship between federal and 
state law, state courts are generally free to apply their own procedural 
rules.193 The Central Vermont Court acknowledged as much, saying that 
“as long as the question involves a mere matter of procedure . . . the 
state court can . . . follow their own practice even in the trial of suits 
arising under the Federal law.”194 But the Court reclassified the local 
rule in Central Vermont from one of procedure to one of substance.195 
This forced the application of the federal rule for contributory-
negligence burdens. 
This reasoning tracks the external-source theory. While it is unclear 
 
 184.  Id. at 510–11. 
 185.  Id. at 510. 
 186.  Id. at 512. 
 187.  Id. at 511. 
 188.  Id. at 512. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 511. 
 191.  See id. (“There can, of course, be no doubt of the general principle that 
matters respecting the remedy . . . depend upon the law of the place where the 
suit is brought.”). 
 192.  Bellia, supra note 87, at 978. 
 193.  See Hardware Dealers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 
158 (1931) (“[T]he procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs 
remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control.”). 
 194.  Cent. Vt., 238 U.S. at 511–12. 
 195.  See id. at 512 (“[I]t is a misnomer to say that the question as to the 
burden of proof as to contributory negligence is a mere matter of procedure.”). 
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whether the Court ultimately adopted the external- or internal-source 
theory to decide the case, its reclassification of the local rule of 
procedure as a substantive rule hints that it had started to think more in 
terms of the external-source theory. And in the Court’s next Reverse-Erie 
case, the external-source theory was able to stand alone. 
b. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack—1942 
 
In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack,196 the Supreme Court committed 
itself to a purely external-source-theory method of reasoning. There, the 
Court handled a Jones Act197 case involving the burden of proof 
required under admiralty law.198 In relevant part, the Jones Act is based 
upon and incorporates by reference FELA, the substantive federal law at 
issue in Central Vermont and that would arise again in Brown v. Western 
Railway of Alabama199 and Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad 
Co.200 In Garrett, a seaman working for the Moore-McCormack Company 
was injured while working on board a vessel traveling between the 
United States and Europe.201 Garrett sued in Pennsylvania state court, 
claiming his injury was attributable to the negligence of Moore-
McCormack.202 Moore-McCormack asserted as a defense the fact that 
Garrett had signed a release of all liability.203 Garrett, in turn, claimed 
the release was fraudulently obtained.204 In determining the release’s 
validity, the Pennsylvania courts enforced a state rule of procedure that 
placed the burden of proof upon the plaintiff to invalidate the release.205 
In contrast, if the case had been brought in federal court, the burden of 
proof would have been borne by the defendant,206 even though the 
burden is not explicitly mentioned in either FELA or the Jones Act.207 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether state or federal 
procedure applied to Garrett’s claim. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania state courts and 
 
 196.  317 U.S. 239 (1942). 
 197.  46 U.S.C. §§ 50101–58109 (2012). 
 198.  Garrett, 317 U.S. at 240. 
 199.  338 U.S. 294 (1949); see infra Part III.B.2.c. 
 200. 342 U.S. 359 (1952); see infra Part III.B.2.d. 
 201.  Garrett, 317 U.S. at 240. 
 202.  Id. at 240–41. 
 203.  Id. at 241. 
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Id. at 242. 
 206.  Id. at 248. 
 207.  See id. at 244 (“The Act is based upon and incorporates by reference 
[FELA].”); cf. Cent. Vt. R.R. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 511 (1915) (commenting on 
how FELA does not mention burdens of proof). 
ARTICLE 6 -  TARPLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2015  2:10 PM 
238 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 32:1 
imposed federal procedure on the state court adjudication.208 Oddly, the 
Court agreed with the method of state court analysis, though it 
disagreed with the ultimate result. Before the case’s appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had applied a 
conflict-of-law substance/procedure dichotomy, concluding that state 
procedure must apply because of the court’s “belief that the rule as to 
burden of proof on releases does not affect the substantive rights of the 
parties, but is merely procedural, and is therefore controlled by state 
law.”209 In reversing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the United States 
Supreme Court retained the conflict-of-law analysis but reclassified the 
burden of proof as a substantive requirement.210 
The Supreme Court’s (and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s) 
reasoning tracked the external-source theory. Because it could not cite a 
part of the Jones Act relating to the burden of proof, the Court avoided a 
pre-emption analysis, and instead turned to other sources of broad 
federal supremacy.211 The Court specifically referred to a desire for 
uniform application of federal law, irrespective of local rules of 
procedure.212 The Court’s analysis culminated in a reclassification of the 
burden-of-proof requirement as substantive.213 The Court therefore 
displaced a state rule of procedure not because Congress declared the 
burden of proof to be “the very substance of [a Jones Act] claim,”214 but, 
rather, because the Court itself did. And once the right was declared to 
be one of substance, as opposed to procedure, the Court could freely 
impose it on state adjudications.215 
c. Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama—1949 
 
Seven years later, in Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,216 the 
Supreme Court built on Garrett’s acceptance of the external-source 
theory by refocusing the analysis. The Court shied away from the 
conflict-of-law principles that it had utilized in Garrett and instead used 
a conflict pre-emption analysis to determine which rule of pleading 
should apply. What separates this case from those under the internal-
 
 208.  Garrett, 317 U.S. at 243. 
 209.  Id. at 242. 
 210.  Id. at 249. 
 211.  See, e.g., id. at 244 (“[T]his Court has [often] declared the necessary 
dominance of admiralty principles in actions in vindication of rights arising from 
admiralty law.” (emphases added)). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. at 248–49. 
 214.  Id. at 249. 
 215.  Id. at 245. 
 216.  338 U.S. 294 (1949). 
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source theory and what gives the external-source theory its name is that 
here, unlike in Howlett v. Rose217 for example, the federal procedure 
originated outside of the federal substantive claim. 
In the case, Richard Brown brought a FELA claim against the 
Western Railway of Alabama in a Georgia state court.218 The defendant 
railway claimed that Brown’s pleading “failed to set forth a cause of 
action and is otherwise insufficient in law.”219 Both the state trial court 
and state court of appeals agreed with the railway and found Brown’s 
claim to be insufficiently pleaded under Georgia’s strict pleading 
standards.220 The case was appealed up to the United States Supreme 
Court, which granted certiorari because “the implications of the 
dismissal were considered important to a correct and uniform 
application of the federal act in the state and federal courts.”221 The 
Supreme Court, applying federal pleading standards, reversed the state 
courts’ decisions and held that Brown’s pleading was sufficient.222 
In analyzing the case, the Court made several interesting moves. 
The Court first side-steped the conflict-of-law substance/procedure 
analysis, saying that the extent to which “rules of practice and 
procedure may dig themselves into substantive rights is a troublesome 
question” and that its own precedent revealed “the impossibility of 
laying down a precise rule to distinguish ‘substance’ from 
‘procedure.’”223 
Instead of a conflict-of-law analysis, then, the Supreme Court opted 
for a broad conflict pre-emption analysis. The Court determined that 
Georgia’s pleading standard, which construed all pleadings against the 
pleader, burdened the federal right asserted under FELA.224 But the 
Court only hinted at what it meant by “burden.” The Court lamented 
that failing “to protect federally created rights from dismissal because of 
over-exacting local requirements for meticulous pleadings [would 
preclude achieving] desirable uniformity in adjudication of federally 
created rights.”225 The Court therefore pre-empted Georgia’s pleading 
standard not because it was stricter than the federal standard, as some 
commenters have argued,226 but rather because the resulting difference in 
 
 217.  496 U.S. 356 (1990). 
 218.  Brown, 338 U.S. at 294. 
 219.  Id. at 295. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. at 296. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at 298. 
 225.  Id. at 299. 
 226.  E.g., Michalski, supra note 14, at 121. 
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pleading standards was undesirable.227 
The Court’s decision in Brown provides a helpful look into the 
mechanics of the external-source theory. Possibly uneasy with the 
thought of reclassifying a pleading rule as substantive, the Court could 
not rely heavily on the conflict-of-law approaches in Garrett and Central 
Vermont. Yet the Court still had to find some way to protect what it 
considered to be desirable uniformity under the newly enacted Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court’s solution was to expand its pre-
emption jurisprudence to include pleading rules. But importantly here, 
the federal rule of pleading is neither mentioned in FELA’s text or 
purpose. The Court therefore had to look outside the federal substantive 
claim to find the procedure it chose to enforce. 
The majority’s move did not escape notice. Justices Frankfurter and 
Jackson, in dissent, worried what this decision portended for 
federalism.228 State courts, they acknowledged, are empowered to hear 
federal claims.229 But they argued that, although state courts are 
required to implement federal substantive law, they should be allowed 
to apply “such structures and functions as the States are free to devise 
and define.”230 Moreover, the Justices believed that “if a litigant chooses 
to enforce a Federal right in a State court, he cannot be heard to object if 
he is treated exactly as [state-law-bringing] plaintiffs . . . with regard to 
the form in which the claim must be stated.”231 After all, the plaintiff has 
the choice to file his claim in either state or federal court and he chose to 
 
 227.  See Brown, 338 U.S. at 299 (discussing the federal desire for uniformity). 
Professor Michalski’s point that state court systems may not impermissibly 
burden federal rights is correct, but that was not at issue in Brown. See Michalski, 
supra note 14, at 121 (making this point). Rather, the important issue was one of 
uniformity, which the Court explicitly acknowledged. See Brown, 338 U.S. at 295 
(stating that the reason certiorari was granted was because “the implications of 
the dismissal were considered important to a correct and uniform application of the 
federal act in the state and federal courts” (emphasis added)). Three years later, 
in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co., 342 U.S. 359, Justice 
Frankfurter did address Congress’s purpose in passing FELA in a manner that 
would have implicated the strictness of Georgia’s pleading standard, but no 
similar discussion of purpose exists in either the majority or dissenting opinions 
in Brown. See id. at 368 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[Pre-emption would be 
valid] only on the theory that Congress included as part of the right created by 
[FELA] an assumed likelihood that trying all issues to juries is more favorable to 
plaintiffs.”). 
 228.  Brown, 338 U.S. at 299 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“Insignificant as this 
case appears on the surface, its disposition depends on the adjustment made 
between two judicial systems charged with the enforcement of a law binding on 
both. This, it bears recalling, is an important factor in the working of our 
federalism without needless friction.”). 
 229.  Id. 
 230.  Id. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 231.  Id. 
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file in state court, “[w]ith full knowledge of the niceties of pleading 
required by Georgia.”232 
d. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.—1952 
 
In Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.,233 the last of the 
pure external-source-theory cases, the Supreme Court imposed federal 
procedure without much explanation. In this short case, John F. Dice, a 
railroad fireman, was seriously injured when his train jumped the 
track.234 He promptly sued the railroad under FELA in an Ohio state 
court.235 As part of its defense, the railroad placed into evidence a release 
of liability signed by Dice.236 The Ohio Supreme Court held that, under 
Ohio law, whether the release of liability was obtained fraudulently was 
a question for the judge, rather than the jury.237 Federal law, in contrast, 
required the opposite.238 Thus, the Supreme Court was faced with a 
familiar question: should the state or federal procedure apply to the 
FELA claim in Ohio state court? 
The Court applied federal procedure to the state adjudication.239 
“The right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamental feature of our 
system of federal jurisprudence,” the Court stated, and as such, is “part 
and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad workers under [FELA].”240 
The Court considered the right to a trial by jury too substantial to be 
considered a mere “local rule of procedure” and, therefore, reclassified it 
as a substantive rule. 241 
This decision tracked the external-source theory because it avoided 
invoking a theory of pre-emption and, instead, reclassified the state’s 
procedural rule by heavily relying on conflict-of-law principles.242 While 
the Court did not explicitly state it was avoiding pre-emption-based 
arguments, there are two features of this case that demonstrate the 
 
 232.  Id. at 303 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 233.  342 U.S. 359 (1952). 
 234.  Id. at 360. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. at 361. 
 238.  Id. at 363. 
 239.  Id. at 362–64. 
 240.  Id. at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Cent. Vt. R.R., 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 241.  Id. 
 242. But see Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 921 n.12 (1997) (“[I]n Dice we 
held that the FELA pre-empted a state rule . . . .” (emphasis added)). The Court in 
Johnson may have been misreading its own precedent, however. See Redish & 
Sklaver, supra note 81, at 104 (“At no point in the text of the FELA did Congress 
explicitly directed [sic] the state courts to employ the federal practice . . . .”). 
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Court’s move was deliberate. First, the Court did apply a conflict pre-
emption theory in one of the other holdings in the same case.243 Second, 
the dissent in the case indicates it would have signed onto the majority 
opinion had the theory used been one of conflict pre-emption.244  
The Court therefore adopted a balancing test in which “the forum’s 
interest in employing its own procedures is balanced against the interest 
of the source of the substantive law in assuring that uniform policy goals 
are attained.”245 The use of this balancing test was highlighted by the 
Court’s comment that the state procedure may have survived if “Ohio 
[had] abolished trial by jury in all negligence cases including those 
arising under the federal Act.”246 The likely inference is that changing 
the state’s established and widely-applied procedure would have been 
too burdensome for the Court to impose. 
But even as the Court affirmed its use of the external-source theory 
in Dice, its dissenters grew more numerous.247 Although it would take 
thirty-six years, this minority would eventually establish a majority.248 
e. Felder v. Casey—1988 
 
After a thirty-six year period, the Court returned to the Reverse-
Erie theory. Notably, the dissenting opinions that advocated for a 
limited pre-emption theory in Brown and Dice finally found themselves 
in the majority in Felder v. Casey.249 Unfortunately, the best they could 
muster to keep that majority was a compromise. As noted earlier, Felder 
utilized both internal- and external-source theories.250 Recall that Felder 
involved a Section 1983 claim against the city of Milwaukee and certain 
police officers, claiming that the beating and arrest of Bobby Felder were 
 
 243.  See Dice, 342 U.S. at 362 (“Application of so harsh a rule to defeat a 
railroad employee’s claim is wholly incongruous with the general policy of the 
Act . . . .”); cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (defining conflict pre-
emption as the application of federal law when state law defeats the purpose 
and policy of the federal law). 
 244.  See Dice, 342 U.S. at 368 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[Applying federal 
procedures would be appropriate] only on the theory that Congress included as 
part of the right created by the Employer’s Liability Act an assumed likelihood 
that trying all issues to juries is more favorable to plaintiffs.”). 
 245.  Redish & Sklaver, supra note 81, at 104. 
 246.  Dice, 342 U.S. at 363 (emphasis added). 
 247.  In Brown, only Justices Frankfurter and Jackson dissented. Brown v. W. 
Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949). In Dice, Justices Reed and Burton joined them. 
Dice, 342 U.S. 359. 
 248.  Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 249.  487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
 250.  See discussion of Felder, supra Part III.B.1.b. 
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both unprovoked and racially motivated.251 The police officers moved to 
dismiss Felder’s case, arguing that his suit failed to comply with 
Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute, a local state procedure.252 That 
statute required that every action against any state entity include a 
written notice of the claim within 120 days of the alleged injury.253 
Under federal procedures, Section 1983 contained no such notice-of-
claim requirement.254 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, while 
Congress may establish federal procedure, the states retain the authority 
to prescribe the procedure for all substantive actions, federal or state, 
brought in their courts.255 The United States Supreme Court reversed 
and required the application of federal procedure.256 
While the Court adopted a view of the pre-emption doctrine 
consistent with the internal-source theory, it changed gears in the 
middle of the opinion and provided a second reason for its holding. In 
this second part of its opinion, the Court adopted an outcome-
determinative-based test. Because “the outcome of federal civil rights 
litigation will frequently and predictably depend on whether it is 
brought in . . . federal court,”257 the Court did not allow Wisconsin to 
apply its own procedure. Mirroring Erie’s desire for vertical uniformity 
between state and federal court litigation,258 the Court committed itself 
to a broad understanding of federalism: “the very notions of federalism 
upon which respondents rely dictate that the State’s outcome-
determinative law must give way when a party asserts a federal right in 
state court.”259 
This line of reasoning closely resembles the external-source theory. 
The Court appears to indicate that a state court adjudicating a federal 
law must arrive at the same conclusion a federal court adjudicating the 
same claim would have.260 Such a holding leaves little room for state 
 
 251.  Felder, 487 U.S. at 135. 
 252.  Id. at 135–36. 
 253.  Id. at 136. 
 254.  See id. at 140 (“[In the federal system] the absence of any notice-of-claim 
provision is not a deficiency requiring the importation of such statutes into the 
federal civil rights scheme.” (emphasis added)). 
 255.  Id. at 137. 
 256.  Id. at 138. 
 257.  Id. at 151. 
 258.  See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“[T]he outcome 
of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so far as 
legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State 
court.”). 
 259.  Felder, 487 U.S. at 151. 
 260.  See id. at 152. (“Wisconsin, however, may not alter the outcome of 
federal claims it chooses to entertain in its courts by demanding compliance with 
outcome-determinative rules . . . .”). 
ARTICLE 6 -  TARPLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2015  2:10 PM 
244 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 32:1 
courts to apply their own procedure when adjudicating federal claims.261 
f. Johnson v. Fankell—1997 
 
After Felder, the Supreme Court returned to using only the internal-
source theory in Howlett.262 The brief clarity accompanying such a 
decisive decision was, unfortunately, short lived. Seven years after 
Howlett, the Court decided Johnson v. Fankell263 and reintroduced the 
external-source theory back into Reverse-Erie jurisprudence by issuing 
an opinion relying on both the internal- and external-source theories. 
Recall that in Johnson, the substantive claim involved a Section 1983 
action brought by a liquor store clerk in Idaho against her former 
employers, claiming a deprivation of her Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process rights.264 The clerk’s employers filed a motion for qualified 
immunity.265 When their motion was denied, they appealed, treating the 
denial as an appealable final judgment.266 Had the suit been brought in 
federal court, this would have been appropriate.267 However, under 
Idaho state procedure, a denial of a qualified immunity defense is not 
considered an appealable final decision.268 Thus, the Idaho Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal.269 The United States Supreme Court upheld 
the dismissal.270 While this decision is notable for its limitation on the 
intrusion of federal procedure in state court adjudications, its reasoning 
reveals that the external-source theory survived its brief abandonment 
in Howlett. 
The Court supplied two lines of reasoning in Howlett. Addressing 
the internal-source theory first, the Court looked for the source of the 
federal procedure. As the source of the procedure was in Section 1291, a 
different statute, the state was under no obligation to enforce it.271 
Intriguingly, however, the Court supplied a second reason for its 
decision. 
 
 261.  The dissent viewed this as a substantial problem with the Court’s 
decision. See id. at 161 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[The Court’s] suggestion 
seems to be based on a sort of upside-down theory of federalism . . . .”). 
 262.  See text accompanying the discussion of Howlett, supra Part III.B.1.c. 
 263.  520 U.S. 911 (1997). 
 264.  Id. at 913. 
 265.  Id. 
 266.  Id. 
 267.  See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524–30 (1985) (holding that a 
federal court’s rejection of a qualified immunity defense is an immediately 
appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012)). 
 268.  Johnson, 520 U.S. at 914. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  Id. 
 271.  Johnson, 520 U.S. at 921. 
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In the second part of its opinion, the Court applied the outcome-
determinative test introduced in Felder and, by doing so, the validity of 
the external-source theory. Interpreting the outcome-determinative test 
of Felder as requiring the imposition of federal procedure in all cases, 
petitioners argued that the federal procedure should apply in this 
case.272 The Court, despite acknowledging that the outcome of 
petitioners motion would have come out differently in federal court, 
rejected petitioner’s specific argument.273 But, in doing so, the Court was 
not abandoning the outcome-determinative test—it was simply 
clarifying it. This test, the Court explained, is not triggered when just 
any decision comes out differently in state court. Rather, “outcome, as 
[the Court] used the term [in Felder], referred [only] to the ultimate 
disposition of the case.”274 
Following this explanation, the Court inserted a safety valve into its 
Reverse-Erie jurisprudence. Finding that “countervailing 
considerations” weighed too strongly against the application of federal 
procedure in state court, the Court stated that its “respect [for principles 
of federalism] is at its apex when [it] confront[s] a claim that federal law 
requires a State to undertake something as fundamental as restructuring 
the operation of its courts.”275 Reticent to require the state court to 
completely change its procedural systems, the Court signaled that its 
Reverse-Erie jurisprudence should take into consideration the degree of 
disruption in state court. 
The fact that, in Howlett, the Court allowed Idaho’s state procedure 
to govern does not mean that the external-source theory—or Reverse-
Erie generally—is no longer as robust as it once was. It is important to 
remember that the external-source theory is not black and white; it 
represents a balancing test.276 It is to be expected, then, that from time to 
time the Court will refrain from imposing federal procedure—a fact that 
makes the ultimate disposition of the case the least important part of it. 
What is important is that the Court’s reference to Felder’s outcome-
determinative theory reveals that it is still willing to entertain external-
source theory reasoning.  
4. Summary of External-Source Theory 
 
Like its internal counterpart, the external-source theory has 
 
 272.  Id. at 918. 
 273.  Id. at 915. 
 274.  Id. at 921 (emphasis added). 
 275.  Id. at 922. 
 276.  See, e.g., Chen, supra note 2, at 1447 (explaining the Court’s “balancing 
[of] the competing sovereign interests, a technique not used in Brown”). 
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survived since 1915. Unlike the internal-source theory, which has 
remained largely the same since Central Vermont, the external-source 
theory has grown and brought new and different principles under its 
umbrella. At its very essence, the external-source theory is a broad 
interest-balancing test weighted towards keeping federal substantive 
and procedural rights together. In this balancing test, the Court weighs 
conflict pre-emption, conflict-of-law, and outcome determinative 
theories, the federal and state interests involved, and the degree of 
disruption pre-emption would cause. With respect to pre-emption, the 
Court is willing to look outside the four corners of the substantive claim 
involved to find the procedure. Regarding conflict-of-law principles, the 
Court is willing, and in fact sometimes eager, to reclassify seemingly 
procedural rules as substantive. And the Court has recently reaffirmed 
its acceptance of an outcome-determinative approach to Reverse-Erie, 
under which the Court is likely to pre-empt any state rule that would 
lead to different results in different courts. When the Court weighs 
federal interests, it heavily weighs a desire for procedural uniformity. 
But the Court has also expressed concern when imposing federal 
procedures that would require a state to significantly restructure its 
procedural systems. Even so, under the external-source theory, the 
Court is much less concerned with principles of federalism and is more 
willing to assert federal dominance than it is under the internal-source 
theory. 
IV. THE ANSWER 
This overview of Reverse-Erie reveals a potentially unsatisfying 
conclusion. The question posed by this Note asks which set of 
procedural rules—federal or state—must apply in an Alaska state court 
adjudication of a federal substantive claim when Congress, the 
Constitution, and the Courts have not spoken. Unfortunately, there is no 
single, clear answer. Even so, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will 
impose the new federal plausibility pleading standard from Bell Atlantic 
Co. v. Twombly277 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal278 onto state courts. Such a move 
would likely upset the federal/state balance too much. 
The Court would be unlikely to pre-empt notice pleading in state 
court under the internal-source theory. To justify such an action the 
Court would have to find an explicit pro-defendant purpose behind the 
federal substantive claim. Lacking such a purpose, the Court would be 
reticent to reclassify the pleading procedure as a substantive right and 
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therefore would not pre-empt the state pleading standard. 
While the Court might be more inclined to pre-empt a state’s notice 
pleading regime under the external-source theory, it is still unlikely to 
do so. The key reason for this is the defendant’s ability to remove a case 
to federal court. Should a defendant feel disadvantaged by how easily a 
plaintiff could bring a suit against him, he can remove the case to federal 
court and take advantage of its heightened pleading standard.279 This 
ability provides a compelling and practical reason for the Court to avoid 
pre-empting Alaska’s pleading standard. 
That said, it is theoretically possible to justify such pre-emption. 
Because Iqbal’s plausibility standard increases a plaintiff’s burden for 
getting into federal court, as compared to Alaska’s notice pleading 
standard, the state’s policy broadly swings pro-plaintiff and the federal 
policy swings pro-defendant. But as Justice O’Connor put it, “it should 
follow [from Reverse-Erie] that defendants, as well as plaintiffs, are 
entitled to the benefit of all federal court procedural rules that are 
‘outcome determinative.’”280 Taking this position seriously could allow 
the Court to impose the federal pro-defendant pleading policy on states, 
like Alaska, that would otherwise favor plaintiffs.281 
For now, Alaska and the other notice pleading states can breathe 
easy. While the possibility exists they will be forced to change their 
pleading standards, the probability—and in fact the plausibility—of 
such a ruling is very low. Of course, if any state has a desire to change its 
procedure, it may do so even without a Supreme Court mandate.282 
 
 
 279.  See Chen, supra note 2, at 1450 (“The ability to remove federal cases 
significantly reduces forum-shopping opportunities.”). 
 280.  Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 161 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 281.  An example of a similar situation would be a possible implication of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which applies a heightened “particularity” 
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benefits and pitfalls of voluntary adoption of the federal pleading standard 
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decision to adopt some of the Federal Rules. Carl Tobias, A Civil Discovery 
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CONCLUSION 
For the last century, the Reverse-Erie doctrine has hidden in the 
shadows of Erie and other monolithic constitutional doctrines. Now, as 
states are starting to assert their own local procedural dominance, 
Reverse-Erie has a chance to stand again in the light of day. The advent 
of plausibility pleading has presented courts across the nation with an 
opportunity to re-examine their own pleading standards and procedural 
systems. More importantly, it has provided the Supreme Court an 
opportunity to apply Reverse-Erie to one of the most essential aspects of 
civil procedure: pleading standards. 
This Note has demonstrated how the twin theories within Reverse-
Erie have guided Supreme Court jurisprudence throughout the 
Twentieth Century. As these theories have competed for prominence, 
they have displayed the differing opinions on federalism that exist on 
the Supreme Court. Because no definitive decision has been rendered, 
there remains ample room for debate on how these theories should be 
applied in the future. Whether one of these theories will someday stand 
vindicated, the other denigrated as a backwards approach to a bygone 
era of federalism, remains to be seen. 
